Quick Answer
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) requires written controls for objective equity research and conflicts involving reports, appearances and outside interactions. Apply actual supervisory registration, compensation basis and trading-account definitions. Ordinary banking separation and annual committee controls have limited exemptions. Prohibited pay bases, retaliation protection and trading safeguards remain distinct duties; firm-wide banking revenue alone does not establish prohibited compensation.
Research analysts face structural conflicts when their firm earns investment banking (IB) fees from companies they cover. Banking can pressure analysts to initiate favorable coverage, suppress unfavorable views or accept pay based on banking contributions. Conflicts can also involve sales and trading, subject companies and customers.
The rule addresses the conflict by mandating a written framework, structural separation, and personal-trading discipline.
Written Policies and Procedures Requirement
Each member firm must establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to:
- Identify and manage conflicts of interest involving research analysts
- Promote objective and reliable research reflecting analysts' truly held opinions
- Prevent research or analysts from manipulating or conditioning the market or favoring firm or customer interests, including misuse to obtain banking business
Supervision requires registration appropriate to the actual functions. Overall conduct supervision of registered equity Research Analysts or Supervisory Analysts ordinarily requires Research Principal registration. Ordinary qualification combines Research Analyst or Supervisory Analyst registration with the General Securities Principal examination (Series 24), held by the same person.
Series 87 alone is not Research Analyst registration, and two employees cannot pool separate examination passes into one person's registration. Applicable prior qualifications, registration lapse and relief must be assessed.
A role limited solely to equity content approval may instead use a Supervisory Analyst (Series 16). Disclosure-only equity review may use a General Securities Principal. A role limited solely to debt or third-party content approval may use a General Securities Principal or Supervisory Analyst. One appropriately registered person may perform multiple functions; a mandatory Series 24 framework owner and separate Series 16 approver is not the rule.
Registration and approval timing are separate questions. Equity retail research requiring pre-use approval needs an appropriately registered approver. Correspondence and institutional communications follow their own supervision and review routes, including applicable exceptions; not every research report universally requires approval before use.
The firm must establish, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures (WSPs) reasonably designed to achieve compliance for its business and associated persons' activities, including applicable research duties. It must promptly amend those procedures as applicable rules or its supervisory system change and communicate relevant procedures and amendments to the associated persons concerned.
The principal need not personally write each report. They maintain a framework reasonably designed for the firm's current operations. Others may assist with drafting procedures without replacing qualified supervisory responsibility.
Exam Tip: Gotchas
- The firm must establish, maintain and enforce reasonably designed research-conflict procedures.
- Promises of favorable research to obtain business or compensation are prohibited.
Information Barriers Between Research and Investment Banking
Under the ordinary controls, with no applicable exemption, information barriers or other institutional safeguards insulate analysts from review, pressure or oversight by banking or other potentially biased persons, including sales and trading. These controls do not require a physical wall or prohibit every outside interaction:
| Restriction | What It Means |
|---|---|
| No IB pre-publication review | Banking personnel may not review, clear or approve a draft. Review by other persons not responsible for preparation, content and distribution must be restricted or prohibited, with the legal/compliance exception. The controlled factual-review route can reach non-banking personnel or the subject company, but not banking under these ordinary controls |
| Research holds coverage decisions | Research management makes every final coverage decision; IB cannot direct who gets covered or who gets dropped. The firm must restrict or limit IB input into coverage decisions, not ban it: IB or any other department, such as sales, may convey customer interest or offer input, but research management decides independently and analysts must be insulated from pressure |
| Independent research-budget authority | Senior management determines the research department's budget, excluding senior management engaged in investment banking services activities |
| Managed IB-research contact | The firm's written policies must identify and manage the conflicts in contact between analysts and IB, and insulate analysts from IB review, pressure, or oversight. FINRA's rule sets no chaperone requirement; a firm may route these communications through legal/compliance as its own procedure, and its people must then follow it |
| No analyst participation in deal pitches | Analysts may not participate in banking pitches or other solicitations, road shows or issuer marketing related to banking transactions. The specified attendance exception is a pitch for an emerging growth company (EGC) initial public offering (IPO) also attended by bankers. The analyst still may not solicit banking business or engage in other prohibited conduct |
| No marketing direction to analysts | IB may NOT, directly or indirectly, direct an analyst to engage in sales or marketing efforts related to an investment banking deal, or to engage in any communication with a current or prospective customer about an investment banking deal |
The firm must enforce effective safeguards. Communication and coverage records can evidence implementation; a particular log or meeting cycle is not universally named by this provision. Follow records and routing requirements that the firm's own procedures prescribe. Separate Global Research Analyst Settlement obligations apply to covered firms and do not create a universal chaperone requirement.
An analyst may not communicate with a current or prospective customer about an investment banking transaction in the presence of investment banking personnel or company management, even without banking direction. Any written or oral analyst communication with a current or prospective customer or internal personnel about such a transaction must be fair, balanced and not misleading, considering its overall context.
For issuer or non-banking factual review, omit the summary, rating and price target from the submitted sections. Legal or compliance must receive the complete draft first. If research later proposes changing the rating or target, it must first provide written justification and receive written authorization from legal or compliance.
Retain drafts and the final report for three years after publication. Issuer prepublication review for purposes other than verifying facts is prohibited.
Due diligence has a timing line. An analyst may not perform joint due diligence (confirming the adequacy of disclosure in the offering document) in the presence of investment banking personnel before the issuer has selected its underwriters. After that selection, the prohibition no longer applies.
FINRA also does not apply the joint due-diligence prohibition to a communication with the management of an EGC that both the analyst and an investment banker attend, because the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act bars FINRA from restricting that communication.
Exam Tip: Gotchas
- Ordinary factual review excludes the summary, rating and target and follows prior legal or compliance receipt of the complete draft.
- Research management makes final coverage decisions; banking input is restricted, not an instruction to cover.
- The specified pitch-attendance exception concerns an emerging-growth-company IPO and does not permit solicitation.
Research Analyst Compensation
Compensation can create pressure on research through both the pay basis and the people who evaluate or determine it:
- Compensation may not be based on specific investment banking services transactions or the analyst's contributions to the member's investment banking services activities. The contributions branch is not limited to a specific deal.
- Under ordinary controls, banking personnel may not supervise or control analysts, including influence or control over compensation evaluation or determination. A supposedly non-binding pay recommendation can violate this control even without final approval authority.
- With no applicable exemption, compensation of an analyst primarily responsible for report substance must be reviewed and approved at least annually by a committee with no banking representatives. That committee reports to the board, or a senior executive officer if there is no board.
- The committee considers, if applicable, individual performance including productivity and research quality; correlation between recommendations and recommended-security performance; and overall ratings from clients, the sales force and peers independent of banking, plus other independent ratings services. It must document the individual pay basis. The annual committee target is narrower than every person covered by the research-analyst definition.
Firm-wide financial performance, including investment banking revenues, is not by itself a prohibited pay basis. A firm-wide revenue factor differs from specific transactions or analyst-specific banking contributions. Required report disclosure expressly addresses analyst compensation based, among other factors, on member banking revenues. That disclosure does not cure an independently prohibited pay basis, banking influence or missing applicable committee duties.
A pool funded from identified transaction fees can make each award depend on specific banking transactions even if allocated by research performance. Credit for an analyst's banking contributions across many engagements is also prohibited.
A general firm pool or restricted firm-share grant is not prohibited solely because banking results affect the firm's finances or share value. Assess the actual award basis, evaluation and approval process, and applicable disclosures.
Exam Tip: Gotchas
- Where required, a non-banking committee reviews covered analyst compensation annually and documents its basis.
- Firm-wide banking revenue alone differs from pay tied to specific transactions or analyst contributions.
- Assess the pool’s funding and all applicable review factors.
Limited Investment Banking Activity
The specified exemption uses the previous three years' average annual activity: 10 or fewer transactions as manager or co-manager and $5 million or less gross banking revenues from those transactions. Both tests must be met. Corporate debt and equity underwriting count; municipal securities do not. Neither a single year's result nor firm headcount substitutes for these tests.
The exemption removes specified ordinary controls for banking prepublication review, coverage input, supervision/pay influence, research budget, annual committee review and the ordinary barrier requirement. It still requires insulation from biased pressure, written conflict management and objective research. Prohibited compensation bases, retaliation, trading, favorable-research promises, solicitation and marketing restrictions, issuer factual-review limits and other duties remain. It does not waive registration appropriate to an actual supervisory role.
Maintain records sufficient to establish eligibility and, for at least three years, communications that would otherwise have been subject to those exempted controls. This relief does not nullify the entire research framework. Separately granted exceptional good-cause relief requires its actual terms; firm size or convenience does not establish it.
Anti-Retaliation
The anti-retaliation safeguard protects analysts employed by the member or its affiliates:
- Investment banking personnel or other employees may not directly or indirectly retaliate or threaten retaliation because of an adverse, negative or otherwise unfavorable research report or public appearance that may adversely affect the member's present or prospective business interests, not only banking relationships
An analyst employed by the member issues a research report with a sell rating on a banking client that may cost the member business, and management cuts their bonus to punish that report. The established retaliatory basis violates the safeguard. A banking complaint followed by a cut, without facts establishing why it occurred, is instead a red flag requiring inquiry.
Indirect retaliation also qualifies when imposed because of covered unfavorable research, including blacklisting an analyst from the firm's most desirable coverage assignments, freezing them out of management meetings, or denying them resources.
The principal supervising research has to be alert to retaliation that masquerades as a normal business decision. A demotion shortly after a sell rating that cost the firm a deal calls for inquiry into the actual reason; timing and the lost deal alone do not establish punishment for the report.
Exam Tip: Gotchas
- Retaliation or threats can include pay cuts, demotion or resource denial when caused by covered unfavorable research.
- Timing and performance records are evidence, not conclusive proof or immunity.
Personal-Trading Restrictions on Research Analysts
Identify the account and actor before applying a restriction. A research analyst includes an associated person primarily responsible for report substance and associated persons reporting directly or indirectly to an analyst in connection with preparing that substance, regardless of title.
A research analyst account is an account in which an analyst or household member has a financial interest, or over which the analyst has discretion or control. Household means the same principal residence, excluding an unrelated resident financially independent of the analyst. Spousal status alone does not establish household membership.
The account definition excludes a registered investment company controlled by the analyst or household member when their only financial interest is a management or performance fee, and a blind trust controlled by someone else when neither knows its investments or transactions.
| Restriction | What It Prohibits |
|---|---|
| Trading ahead of research | Research analyst accounts, analyst supervisors and associated content influencers may not benefit in trading from advance knowledge of report content or timing before intended recipients have had a reasonable opportunity to act. Publication alone does not end this safeguard |
| Trading inconsistent with the latest recommendation | Research analyst accounts may not trade inconsistently with the analyst's most recent published recommendation, subject to actual defined hardship or qualifying liquidation-plan conditions. This is not automatically a restriction on every supervisor or content influencer |
| Pre-IPO purchase prohibition | A research-analyst account may NOT purchase or receive a security before the issuer's initial public offering if the issuer is principally engaged in the same type of business as the companies the analyst covers |
Required trading controls reach covered securities, their derivatives and funds whose performance is materially dependent on covered securities. An inconsistent short or bearish option purchase in an analyst account is prohibited absent actual relief.
A fund label does not exempt a materially dependent position, but a concentration percentage or largest-constituent label alone is not a universal threshold. Apply the actual recommendation, rating meaning and economic position rather than assuming every sale against a buy or hold label has the same result.
An associated content influencer is required to review report content or has exercised authority to review or change it before publication or distribution. Legal or compliance reviewers acting for compliance purposes are excluded only if they lack authority to dictate a recommendation, rating or target.
Mere advance access is not that definition; job title alone is insufficient. Analyst supervisors are expressly covered by the trading-ahead safeguard whether or not separately content influencers.
Exam Tip: Gotchas
- Trading-ahead restrictions cover analyst accounts, supervisors and defined content influencers; other personal-trading restrictions target analyst accounts.
- Ordinary preclearance cannot cure prohibited trading; hardship and liquidation-plan relief have separate conditions.
What Should You Check on Exam Day?
- Can you identify registration appropriate to actual research duties and distinguish it from communication-specific approval timing?
- Can you apply ordinary review, coverage and interaction controls, the complete factual-review conditions and the specified emerging-growth exceptions?
- Can you distinguish firm-wide banking revenue from specific transactions and analyst contributions, apply the committee's actual target, and preserve duties retained under limited-banking relief?
- Can you assess both retaliation and threats from actual reasons, treating timing and performance records as evidence rather than conclusive findings or immunity?
- Can you distinguish trading-ahead actors from research analyst account restrictions, including account exclusions, actual relief conditions and recipients' reasonable opportunity to act?